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This paper highlights the diversity of the Public Works concept and the implications of this diversity 
for effective social protection programming.  The paper outlines the heterogeneity of programmes 
currently implemented under the broad terminology of ‘Public Works’ and the conceptual confusion 
that arises as a result of the use of the generic term Public Works Programme (PWP) to describe a 
range of highly diverse programmes without making adequate distinction between the different 
forms, together with the programming errors which ensue from this conceptual confusion. One 
particularly egregious result of this lack of clarity is the repeated implementation of PWPs offering 
only a single short term episode of employment in low and middle income countries where 
unemployment is principally structural, an intervention which is unlikely to offer significant or 
sustained social protection benefits for participants. In an attempt to address to this problem, a 
typology of PWPs is presented to provide a framework for a more systematic and insightful 
engagement with PWPs, which links PWP form to likely social protection outcomes in differing 
labour market contexts.     2
Recognising Heterogeneity: A Proposed Typology for Public Works Programmes  
This paper highlights the diversity of the Public Works concept and the implications of this diversity 
for effective social protection programming.  First working definitions of the terms public works and 
social protection are offered, and then the paper offers a brief history of PWP programming and 
outlines the heterogeneity of programmes currently implemented under the broad terminology of 
‘Public Works’.  Next the paper sets out the conceptual confusion that arises as a result of the use of 
the generic term Public Works Programme (PWP) to describe a range of highly diverse programmes 
without making adequate distinction between the different forms, together with the programming 
errors which ensue from this conceptual confusion. One particularly egregious result of this lack of 
clarity is the repeated implementation of PWPs offering only a single short term episode of 
employment in low and middle income countries where unemployment is principally structural, an 
intervention which is unlikely to offer significant or sustained social protection benefits for 
participants. In an attempt to address to this problem, a typology of PWPs is presented to provide a 
framework for a more systematic and insightful engagement with PWPs, and a schema of 
programme objectives put forward, highlighting the diversity of objectives associated with PWP 
programming. Finally the relationships between PWP type, objectives and the labour market context 
are discussed, and implications drawn in terms of the likely social protection outcomes.  
PWP Definitions  
There are numerous kinds of public works programmes, but the key components are the provision 
of employment for the creation of public assets at a prescribed wage for those unable to find 
alternative employment, in order to provide some form of social safety net. For the purpose of this 
paper, PWP are defined as all activities which entail the payment of a wage (in cash or in kind) by the 
state, or by an agent acting on behalf of the state, in return for the provision of labour, in order to i) 
enhance employment and ii) produce an asset (either physical or social), with the overall objective of 
promoting social protection for participants.  The concept is defined more loosely in much of the 
literature linked to the World Bank, as set out by Subbarao, who defines public works programmes 
as: 
‘... programmes in which participants must work to obtain benefits. These programmes offer 
temporary employment at a low wage rate, and have been widely used for fighting poverty.’ 
(2001:2) 
It is interesting to note, according to this definition, that PWP are inherently temporary, an issue 
which will be discussed in detail below.   
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Social protection, the outcome against which PWP are considered in this paper, is a contested term, 
however, for the purposes of this paper, it may usefully be defined as: 
 
‘public actions taken in response to levels of vulnerability, risk, and deprivation which are 
deemed socially unacceptable within a given polity or society’  (Conway, de Haan and 
Norton, 2000:5).   
 
There are a number of variant forms of PWP. The majority offer either food or cash in return for 
physical labour, known as food-for-work (FFW) or cash-for-work (CFW) programmes, respectively.  
Whether cash, food or other inputs are the most appropriate mode of payment varies according to 
the nature of the labour market deficiency which has created the need for the intervention. In 
situations where security is poor, food is not readily available, or food cost inflation is high, food 
often remains the optimal form of payment (Basu, 1996)
1.  In some programmes, the wage in the 
form of food is used as an incentive for communities to construct assets (food-for-assets or FFA), or 
to participate in training programmes, (food-for-training or FFT), which expands the concept of 
PWP still further.  Recently, the World Food Programme has adopted the terms Food for Assets 
(FFA), and Targeted Food Distribution for Assets (TFDA) to describe their PWPs. This indicates that 
food is being given to assist communities in producing assets of economic value to them in an 
attempt to alter the beneficiary perception that the work requirement represents a form of 
conditionality which must be fulfilled in order to access food, irrespective of the quality or value of 
the asset created
2 (McCord 2005a). Programmes using a food rather than cash wage benefit tend to 
be implemented or supported by agencies such as WFP or USAID, which have historically had 
surplus food stocks at their disposal but limited access to capital to fund conventional CFW 
initiatives (ibid).
3 Other PWPs offer alternative forms of payment, such as inputs-for-work (IFW) 
where the wage is paid in the form of agricultural inputs (fertilizers and seeds) as in the Malawian 
Government’s Inputs for Assets (IFA) programme (UK DFID 2004).   
 
The PWP concept is further complicated by the fact that the term ‘workfare programme’ is used 
synonymously with ‘public works programme’ in much World Bank literature (Subbarao 2001: 2; 
Vodopivec 2004). This loose use of terminology is problematic given the specific labour market 
                                                            
1 NGOs in Ethiopia are conducting pilot programmes to test the relative performance of different forms of PWP 
remuneration and beneficiary preferences. (Devereux et al. 2005) 
2 The WFP presents this approach as a ‘soft’ PWP, an intermediary step between the free (unconditional) food 
distributions provided by WFP in emergency contexts, and the cessation of food distributions once the crisis has 
abated. Thus it attempts to introduce a market dimension into the relationship between the beneficiary and the aid 
agency in terms of the reciprocity of food receipt in return for work.  
3 The 40% global grain price rise in 2007/8 severely reduced the operating grain surplus of both USAID and WFP, 
and so the incidence of such programmes in the future is likely to be limited.    4
origins and policy objectives associated with the ‘workfare’ concept, along with the fact that this 
represents only one possible component of the broader and pluralistic public works concept
4. The 
range of variant PWP forms and nomenclature inconsistencies identified so far contributes to the 
poorly conceptualised usage of the term PWP in both the literature and policy discourses. Thus the 
generic term ‘public works’ tends to be used for a multitude of divergent programmes, diverse in 
both design and objectives. This conceptual melee is acknowledged by Subbarao, who states that: 
There is much confusion about the meaning and scope of public works programs (also 
known as workfare programs) across countries. (2001: 2) 
Viewed in terms of their position in the social protection lexicon, PWPs are sometimes considered a 
particular form of conditional transfer (see Samson, van Niekerk and Mac Quene 2006: 8), with the 
transfer benefit being given in return for the fulfilment of the work requirement. But this 
categorisation is not unproblematic, and it is argued in this paper that there are critical differences 
between PWP and cash transfers which have a significant impact on their respective social 
protection functions. 
Notwithstanding these definitional problems, the core PWP concept implies a labour-oriented form 
of social protection instrument in which a wage is provided in return for labour, with the objective 
of providing a safety net at a time when regular wage employment or participation in normal 
livelihoods activities is disrupted. This can be due to an economic, political or environmental shock, 
a structural shift in the economy caused by adverse global trading conditions, or classical 
unemployment due to chronically low rates of capital accumulation. They are intended to provide a 
basic income and prevent the distressed selling of assets in order to meet subsistence needs. 
Frequently they involve the creation or maintenance of potentially productive infrastructure, such as 
roads or irrigation systems which are also intended to contribute directly to the livelihoods of 
participants. Depending on the nature of the causes driving the implementation of a particular PWP, 
other objectives of greater or lesser importance may include skills development through work 
experience and on-the-job training, the stimulation of economic growth through the promotion of 
demand among PWP beneficiaries, and the maintenance of social and political order in the context 
of unacceptably high levels of unemployment and poverty. This range of objectives is explored in 
more detail below.  
                                                            
4 Workfare is associated with the US active labour market policies initiated in the 1980s, and with similar UK 
policies known as ‘welfare to work’. These attempted to make unemployment benefit conditional on taking up work 
opportunities offered to the unemployed, thereby aiming to reduce frictional unemployment and in this way bring 
down unemployment and demand for social welfare support (McCord 2007b).   5
Programmes are usually self-targeted on the basis of the principle of ‘less eligibility’. This concept 
implies that ‘relief [social assistance] should be limited to an amount and administered in a manner 
which leaves the recipient worse off than the employed’ (Barr, 1998:17). On this basis the value of 
the wage in a PWP is typically kept low in order to ensure that programme participation is an 
attractive option only for the poor unemployed, and will not result in labour market distortion where 
workers are drawn out of other forms of low income employment. This is often achieved by setting 
the wage at or below the market wage, on the assumption that only the target poor will self-select for 
PWP employment at this wage. When such employment is offered to all those seeking work, or at 
least one member of all work-seeking households, the programme is known as ‘universal’. However, 
where the number of those seeking PWP employment exceeds the number of jobs available, access 
is rationed using a variety of mechanisms. These include targeting on the basis of demographic or 
geographical characteristics, allocating employment through lottery systems, as well as community-
targeting where the available employment is allocated by communities among themselves
5.  
The PWP wage (in cash or in kind) is usually given in return for a set amount of work. This is often 
stipulated in terms of the completion of a particular task (task-based employment) in order to avoid 
perverse incentives for workers to extend the time taken to complete a given task, thereby avoiding 
the potential efficiency trade-offs which could result from the adoption of a PWP mode of asset 
production.  
History  
PWPs have been implemented throughout the world for several centuries. Major programmes were 
conducted in Britain and Prussia during periods of labour market disruption and heightened 
unemployment resulting from industrialisation and conflict in the nineteenth century; in the United 
States of America during the Great Depression in the 1930s; and in Africa, Latin America and Asia 
during the second half of the twentieth century (Subbarao et al. 1997). In developing countries, 
PWPs have been used in response to both developmental and emergency crises, while in recent 
decades they have frequently formed a component of World Bank-supported Social Funds, often 
with developmental objectives relating to livelihoods and poverty reduction. Examples are MASAF 
in Malawi and TASAF in Tanzania.  
In Africa programmes have tended to be short term and contingent on donor funding, while in Asia 
multilateral food-aid initiatives supported large-scale food-for-work programmes during the post-
                                                            
5 A range of potential targeting measures is discussed in detail in Coady et al. (2002). This issue is not explored 
further here for lack of space.    6
WWII decades. More recently, many Asian programmes have shifted to cash-for-work and been 
implemented for prolonged periods with primarily domestic funding, for instance in Korea and India 
(Subbarao ibid). While PWPs are generally not used as long term instruments to address poverty, 
there are cases in Asia where they perform this function, most notably the Indian MEGS, initiated 
during the 1960s and still in operation, and the recently introduced National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Programme (NREGP) also in India. These programmes address poverty by attempting to 
ensure sustained access to employment by the poor, thereby in effect guaranteeing a minimum 
regular income and in this way promoting income insecurity and reducing vulnerability.  
Food-for-work (FFW) was particularly popular in the post-war period largely due to the major grain 
surpluses produced by the US which, under Public Law 480 (PL480), were used to support FFW 
programmes around the world. PL480, also known as the Agricultural Trade Development and 
Assistance Act of 1954 or Food for Peace (FFP), is the US policy of using surplus agricultural 
production to supply the world’s largest global food-aid programme, which in 2003 had a total value 
of US$2 billion. However, in recent decades CFW has become increasingly popular, offering a more 
responsive and flexible option for beneficiaries, as cash can be used to meet a range of household 
needs directly, rather than requiring a process of household level monetisation which often entails 
losses in the net transfer value of the commodities provided as in-kind PWP payment. Yet it is often 
donor institutional priorities rather than beneficiary preferences which dictate PWP payment 
modalities. Thus agencies for whom food stocks comprise a large component of their operating 
budget still tend to promote in-kind payment. The World Food Programme and USAID still 
primarily support FFW based PWPs, with USAID utilising food drawn from the Food for Peace 
(FFP) allocation out of US surplus agricultural production.  
PWP Heterogeneity 
As illustrated above, while PWPs share the core characteristics of employing labour for the creation 
of goods,
6 both physical and social in kind and in disproportionately high demand by the poor, at a 
                                                            
6 There are a small number of PWPs that provide private rather than public assets. Examples of these would be 
small-scale localised PWPs designed to assist HIV-affected community members through the creation of household 
level vegetable gardens in Zimbabwe (see McCord (2005)), or components of the Maharashtra Employment 
Guarantee Scheme (MEGS). At times during its 40-year history the latter has created private assets when it has not 
been possible to identify sufficiently labour-absorbing public assets for construction in a particular area. The recently 
introduced NREGP in India has explicitly extended its mandate to include the creation of private assets, as outlined 
by the Indian Centre for Science and Environment: ‘It is argued that though creating private assets goes against the 
objective of a public works programme, the poor quality of public assets, absence of community benefits, and lack of 
maintenance funds is bringing about a change in the profile and ownership of these assets. While it may prove (sic) 
the durability and benefits of assets created under the EGS, it has also raised concerns about the equitable 
distribution of EGS benefits. For instance, farm ponds are in great demand under EGS (sic) in Maharashtra, but these 
are privately owned assets and cost Rs 40,000, require (sic) more than one acre of land and hence benefit only the   7
prescribed wage for those unable to find alternative employment. The primary objective is to provide 
a measure of social protection, and many different kinds of PWP interventions satisfy this criterion. 
PWPs are not monolithic entities, but rather a conceptually varied form of policy instrument which 
can differ in terms of duration, relationship to the labour market, scale, targeting and implementation 
modalities. This diversity is not sufficiently recognised in the literature, and its implications are not 
adequately considered. 
Two critical problems are linked to the failure to recognise the heterogeneity of PWPs and the 
resultant loose terminology and conceptual confusion. The first is the discussion in the literature and 
at policy level of PWP as though it was a unitary concept, resulting in the mistaken attribution of the 
benefits arising from one form of PWP to other types of programme within the genre that are 
different.
7 The second problem, a direct consequence of the first, is the widespread adoption of a 
particular form of PWP shown to be inappropriate which has become the archetype policy in much 
of Sub-Saharan Africa. The issues entailed are explored below. 
The World Bank characterises the PWP as a short-term instrument for responding to acute or 
transient shocks
8. This form of PWP has become common in the programme discourse. By design it 
provides a short-term episode of employment which reduces distress selling of assets, promotes 
consumption smooths income flows on a temporary basis during periods of disrupted access to 
income sources, particularly where the problem is covariate. In the context of a labour market crisis 
designated as acute, the World Bank argues that the use of a PWP instrument offering temporary 
employment may be appropriate in terms of cost and impact, particularly where the output of the 
programme is an asset which will directly reduce the vulnerability of the community to future shocks 
See Subbarao et al. (1997) for a full discussion.  
The kind of short-term PWP outlined above has, however, become synonymous with the term PWP 
in much of the current discourse. This is so because it is widely implemented in a range of contexts 
outside the specific ‘acute shock’ scenario where its efficacy has been identified by the World Bank 
and is consistent with conventional microeconomic theory, pertaining to consumption smoothing 
and asset protection. Normally it is selected in response to a range of labour market deficiencies and 
social protection challenges, without recognition of the fact that this represents only one particular 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
large farmers’ (Centre for Science and Environment, n.d.:9). 
7 For example, President Mbeki of South Africa mistakenly attributed the benefits of an EGS-style long-term PWP 
(Zibambele) to the National Public Works Programme (EPWP), which offers only a single episode of short-term 
employment, in his address to the National Council of Provinces in 2003. 
8 See, for example, the 2001 World Development Report (World Bank, 2001) and the World Bank Poverty Nets 
website (World Bank, 2004).   8
PWP variant, appropriate in a limited set of circumstances rather than being universally effective. If 
examined in the light of limited empirical evidence, it is clear that this form of short-term PWP 
response is not appropriate in many of the contexts in which it is currently adopted.  
In the literature it is argued that this archetypal form of PWP providing short-term employment 
functions as a response to acute or transient labour market disruption and this in itself is not 
problematic. What needs to be questioned is the identification of such PWPs as appropriate 
instruments in contexts not characterised by transient labour market disruption but on the 
assumption that a short-term PWP intervention can effectively address poverty irrespective of the 
nature or cause of the labour market’s malfunctioning.. In the context of chronic poverty and labour 
market failure it is not evident that a short-term PWP intervention will have a significant or sustained 
impact (see McCord 2004 with reference to South Africa). Subbarao et al. reflect this presumption, 
arguing on the basis of cross country experience that: 
‘... public works are essentially a temporary safety net and should never be used as a 
permanent escape route from poverty.’ (1997: 168) 
Subbarao et  al.’s use of the generic term ‘public works’ to describe a specific form or subset of short-
term PWPs illustrates the problem in the discourse, which identifies short-term PWPs with the 
whole genre of PWPs. It can be argued that whether a PWP offers a temporary or permanent route 
out of poverty depends on the kind of PWP being implemented, and it is necessary to deconstruct 
the concept and clarify the characteristics of the PWP under discussion to promote an informed and 
useful debate. This challenges Subbarao et al.’s identification of all public works with short-term public 
works, and their supporting argument that public works generically should not, de facto, be used to 
address chronic poverty.  
Interestingly, while the archetypal short-term PWP is not appropriate as a permanent escape route as 
Subbarao et al. assert, this type of PWP is often mistakenly adopted, even ironically with World Bank 
support, as in the case of the MASAF programme in Malawi. Other forms of PWP which offer 
prolonged or repeated access to PWP employment have been used successfully to provide ongoing 
poverty reduction, such as the MEGS in India.  
The confusion of one archetype for the range of PWP types raises problems for the social protection 
function, as PWPs offering a single short episode of employment are repeatedly prescribed by 
donors and governments in situations of chronic poverty, in the hope that they will provide the 
‘permanent escape route’ that Subbarao himself argues is not an option. The policy documentation 
in support of such programmes repeatedly indicates that governments and donors implementing   9
these programmes anticipate that these policy actions will have a significant social protection 
function that results in sustained improvements in livelihoods and poverty reduction
9.  
The PWP Problem  
The key issue illustrated in the foregoing discussion is that conceptual confusion is leading to 
inappropriate policy choice, programme design errors, and unrealistic expectations on the part of 
implementers. Neither economic theory nor the limited evidence base support the adoption of short-
term PWPs in many contexts in which they are currently implemented. This is probably due in part 
to ideological factors which underlie donor and government preferences for market-based 
development solutions achieveable by the ‘treatment’ of the target group (Surender 2007) and which 
render the archetypal PWP form extremely popular (McCord 2008).
10 
Despite the dominance of the PWP archetype in practice, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, along 
with Subbarao’s identification of this type with the whole genre, many widely differing programmes 
share the generic PWP nomenclature while providing only a small area of shared identity relating to 
social protection and employment. But at the same time, the term PWP is frequently adopted and 
used either generically or without adequate discrimination to ensure a common understanding of the 
particular form of PWP under discussion. The core problem is the lack of a clear conceptual 
framework backing a term which is highly heterogeneous in its manifestations. Definitions which 
might assist in the clarification of the use of PWP terminology are absent in the current debate, 
which instead uses the term PWP as though it were homogenous, and the literature offers no 
typology of the different types of PWP. The purpose of this working paper is to define a typology of 
PWPs while developing a schema of PWP objectives to which it is applicable and on which it rests, 
as even within a single form of PWP there can be a range of different objectives and relative 
priorities. 
A PWP Typology  
The variety of interventions falling under the broad heading of PWP range from large-scale national 
government employment schemes (GES) to more limited project-based or spatially limited 
interventions responding to transient labour market problems. However, in current policy 
discussions there has been no attempt to establish any form of codification of this diversity, and 
there is no typology to facilitate more meaningful analysis or disaggregation of the generic term 
                                                            
9 An example is the DFID-supported PWP in Malawi which has as its goal ‘enhanced livelihoods for poor people in 
Malawi’ (DFID UK, 2004).  
10 The ideological dimensions of PWP selection are not explored further in this paper, but the issue is explored in 
detail in McCord (2008).     10
PWP. A review of the international literature and over 200 separate programmes was carried out by 
the present researcher to identify discrete forms of PWP on the basis of core features relating to 
design and primary objectives.  
The result is a typology of PWPs which groups programmes into four broad types. These types share 
a common PWP identity in the provision of employment with some form of social protection 
objective. But within this common framework there is scope to adopt different realisations of the 
basic public works concept. The two dominant types of PWP are those offering (i) short-term 
employment, and (ii) large-scale government employment programmes including some form of 
employment guarantee.  The two less frequent but still identifiable types are (iii) those promoting 
labour intensification of government infrastructure spending, and (iv) programmes which enhance 
supply-side characteristics that promote ‘employability’.  
It is important to note that while some programmes may include aspects drawn from more than one 
of these types, all PWPs tend to share a primary identity which enables them to be located in one of 
the four categories. This typology is applied within this paper in order to illuminate and to clarify the 
current conceptual confusion. For the sake of brevity the four kinds of programme identified above 
have been called types A, B, C and D as summarised in box 1 below. 
Box 1: PWP Typology 
Type A 
PWPs offering a single short-term episode of employment  
Type B 
Large-scale government employment programmes which may offer some form of employment 
guarantee 
Type C 
Programmes promoting the labour intensification of government infrastructure spending 
Type D 
Programmes which enhance employability 
 
Brief descriptions of each type together with examples are set out below. 
Type A: Short-term Employment 
PWPs offering short-term employment are typically implemented as a response to some form of 
temporary labour market or livelihoods disruption, which may result from environmental (e.g. 
drought, flood or hurricane damage) or economic shocks, such as the East Asian financial crisis.   11
They are mostly, although not exclusively, implemented in the infrastructure sector, and the   
underlying intention is to temporarily increase aggregate employment while providing a basic income 
for consumption smoothing during a limited period of elevated unemployment or livelihoods 
disturbance. These programmes offer basic ‘risk coping’ or ‘protective’ forms of social protection. In 
these programmes, the social protection transfer dominates objectives relating to the provision of 
assets, which may in many instances be essentially a ‘make-work’ activity, selected in order to satisfy 
the work conditionality. 
Such programmes have been frequently implemented in Bangladesh and other Southern Asian states 
in response to climatic shocks. Indonesia’s Padat Karya (PK) programme is an example of such a 
programme developed in response to an economic shock (Vaidya & Abedin 2007). These 
programmes have come to be seen as archetypal PWPs and therefore synonymous with the generic 
term PWP. They are typical of PWPs currently implemented in many sub-Saharan African countries 
(such as South Africa, Malawi, and Tanzania) where their labour market function is less clear, as the 
challenge is not one of temporary disruption but rather of structural and therefore chronically low 
labour demand.  
Type B: Government Employment Schemes/Employment Guarantee Programmes 
Large-scale government employment programmes (GEPs) are a response to chronic or sustained 
levels of elevated unemployment. Their implementation entails significant government expenditure 
on directly employing those who would otherwise be unemployed; that is, the state acts as an 
‘employer of last resort’ (ELR) aiming to raise aggregate employment on a sustained basis. 
Employment may be created in any sector, and may be provided either directly by government or 
indirectly through private sector employers or civil society organisations under contract. The US 
New Deal programmes of the 1930s typify this approach. The objective of these programmes was 
the creation of productive employment opportunities to promote both macroeconomic development 
(increasing aggregate employment and stimulating the economy) and social protection outcomes. A 
subset of GEPs, in which the state guarantees ongoing or repeated episodes of employment on 
demand to those who are eligible, are known as Employment Guarantee Schemes (EGSs). An 
example is the NREGP in India. These programmes provide non-contributory income insurance 
through guaranteed employment for all who seek it.  
The US response to the Great Depression in the 1930s exemplifies a classic public sector 
employment programme. Under the programme massive state expenditure on PWP was initiated, at 
their height absorbing up to 50% of the unemployed in an attempt to stimulate consumer demand 
and prevent the deepening of the economic recession (Harvey 2007a). These programmes take the   12
form of EGSs in some countries, wherein employment is guaranteed to all members of eligible 
groups on demand. Such programmes are currently operational in several states in India, for 
example, the MEGS (see Dev 1995), as well as on the national scale under the recently launched 
NREGP (India: Department of Rural Development 2007). In the Indian context, employment is 
defined as a constitutional right so that the state offers a guaranteed number of days of employment 
each year to one unemployed work seeker from any rural household seeking employment. The 
worker is employed for a maximum of 100 days each year on the creation of community assets and 
is paid the minimum wage. A similar large-scale programme initiated in 2006 is being implemented 
also in Ethiopia in response to the disruption of livelihoods which occurs periodically as the result of 
persistent drought (the Productive Safety Nets Programme or PSNP). Yet the extent to which 
employment can be offered to all seeking it in this case is constrained in practice, particularly in years 
of serious drought, as a cap on total employment creation has been set as part of the project design.
11 
The definition of ‘universal’ is variously interpreted both in PWP design and in the literature. Hence 
access may be rationed even within nominally ‘universal’ programme, or Employment Guarantee 
Schemes (EGSs). Examples of large-scale programmes which attempted to provide some form of 
universal coverage in order to meet explicit social protection objectives are the US New Deal, the 
Jefes programme in Argentina, the Ethiopian PSNP, and the Indian NREGP
12. Logically the most 
generous definition of universal access would demand the provision of employment for all 
unemployed workers, but this is typically mediated by the adoption of criteria limiting eligibility 
based on considerations such as poverty level (as in the New Deal), spatial location of workers (as in 
NREGA open only to the rural unemployed), or some form of household rationing such as offers of 
one job per household (NREGP and Jefes)
 13.  
The Jefes programme had two additional criteria: a demographic condition limiting participation to 
heads of households with children or disabled or pregnant spouses, and an exclusion provision 
applicable to those receiving unemployment insurance or transfer benefits from the government
14. In 
many EGSs attempts have been made to limit ‘demand’ for PWP employment in this way by 
                                                            
11 As an illustration of the scale of demand for PWP employment in Ethiopia, the precursor to the PSNP offered 
temporary work to up to 1.4 million people in drought-affected communities each year between 1999 and 2003 (see 
Subbarao and Smith 2003).  
12 The extent to which such programmes succeed in realising their ‘universal’ aspirations, however defined, varies 
considerably for many reasons including constrained budgets, institutional weaknesses, capacity constraints and 
corruption. 
13 In the PSNP more than one household member can work, but collectively, household members are permitted to 
work only a total of 22 days, thereby earning one month’s wage per household. 
14 Interestingly a companion programme, the Programmea de Emergencie Laboral (PEL), offering similar benefits, 
was implemented for unemployed adults who did not meet the demographic criterion for Jefes participation.   13
adopting criteria that limit eligibility. Interestingly, among the EGSs discussed above, only the Jefes 
programme purposely adopted a low wage to promote self-targeting by the poorest (the dominant 
form of rationing access to PWPs generally), while in the other programmes in this category the 
work requirement alone was the primary targeting mechanism (McCord 2007b). Wages were 
deliberately set at the minimum wage, reflecting an explicit concern among programme designers 
that the value of the labour of PWP participants should not be reduced relative to other labour 
market participants (Harvey 2007a). This ethical concern is not evident in the discussion of other 
types of PWP, where discounting the value of labour of PWP participants relative to others is central 
to programme design and is not identified in the literature as problematic.  
The complication of rationed access even under ‘universal’ EGSs is exacerbated by the frequent 
inability of the state to provide sufficient PWP work for all those eligible. This is due to the 
limitations of state administrative capacity (programme design, technical supervision, execution, etc.), 
thereby further worsening the rationing problem even among those who are eligible. Interestingly, 
this difficulty is accommodated in a number of programmes which offer a commitment to the 
provision of a universal minimum income transfer for the poor as a backup should the state not be 
able to provide adequate employment for all the eligible work-seekers within the programme. 
Recognising that state failure to provide adequate employment runs the risk of undermining PWPs’ 
mass employment and thereby also social protection objectives, the PWPs facing these constraints 
(such as the NREGP, PSNP) have been designed and implemented in such a way that, irrespective 
of whether it is possible to supply adequate PWP employment or not, the programme default is the 
provision of an ongoing (or repeated) cash transfer to those eligible.
15  
In the case of the New Deal’s employment programmes, those who could not be accommodated in 
PWPs, or whose earnings in public or private employment were insufficient to meet their basic 
needs, could apply to local relief agencies for public assistance. In this way the need for an income 
guarantee to back up the government’s job creation efforts was recognised.
16 Hence, in such cases, 
provision of an ongoing transfer is not dependent on the capacity of the state to deliver 
employment; a fundamental difference from programmes where state capacity to deliver is the 
binding constraint on PWP scale, as in the case of the South African EPWP. The centrality of 
                                                            
15 In the case of NREGP, the primary function of the ‘back-up’ unemployment insurance guarantee is to provide an 
incentive for local government to offer sufficient employment since they are obliged to pay the unemployment 
insurance from their own resources, while PWP wages are funded by central government. However, this approach 
also has the implicit function of protecting workers from the inability of local government to provide adequate 
employment.  
16 Harvey 2007, pers. comm.   14
capacity constraints in determining the successful performance of PWP has also been identified by 
Subbarao, who conceded that: 
‘The main constraint in implementing public works programs in much of Africa is the lack of 
capacity.’ (2001: viii) 
Type C: Labour Intensification  
The primary objective of this type of PWP is the construction of assets while increasing aggregate 
labour usage. These programmes are initiated almost exclusively in the infrastructure sector, and 
labour-based techniques are specified in order to promote the absorption of increased amounts of 
labour for each unit of asset constructed. The work of the Ethiopian Rural Roads Authority 
(ERRA), the AGETIP (Agence d’Exécution des Travaux d’Intérêt Public contre le sous-emploi) in 
Senegal, related AFRICATIP-supported programmes in Western Africa, and the ILO’s 
Employment-Intensive Investment Programmes (EIIPs) all promote the use of labour-based 
techniques in the infrastructure sector and are typical of this type of intervention.
17 In such 
programmes the social protection benefits are assumed to result from the increase in aggregate levels 
of employment generated during the creation of assets. What accrues to workers as a direct outcome 
of employment provided is the wage paid and possibly also productive use of the assets created, 
although recent work carried out by the ILO in Ethiopia using the newly developed Rapid 
Assessment of Poverty Impacts (RAPI) methodology indicates that it may not be possible to identify 
sustained benefits resulting from access to the new assets created (Mengesha & Osei-Bonsu 2007).  
While these programmes are primarily aimed at infrastructure provision, they also confer basic short-
term ‘risk coping’ or ‘protective’ social protection benefits, through the wage stream which 
terminates at the point of programme completion. Such programmes also frequently entail the 
promotion of small contractor development, in order to establish a cadre of entrepreneurs able to 
manage ongoing infrastructure provision contracts in a labour-intensive way. 
Type D: The Promotion of Employability  
Finally there is a PWP approach which addresses supply-side constraints to employment, and fosters 
the ‘employability’ of workers by promoting workplace experience and skills formation among the 
unemployed. Such programmes are implemented when the key constraint to employment is 
                                                            
17 The Chinese Yigong-daizhen programme is similarly constituted (see Devereux & Solomon 2006: 23), although in 
this case the objective of simultaneously providing infrastructure and employment coexists with a major forced 
labour component. This is in tension with the definition of PWPs adopted above, that is, the provision of 
remunerated PWP employment to promote social protection outcomes. Therefore such a programme may fall into a 
separate category of interventions, along with forced labour programmes in Burma, and so is not included in this 
typology.    15
identified to be lack of skills rather than lack of employment opportunities per se. These programmes 
have been adopted principally in Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries at times of high frictional unemployment, i.e. when the fundamental problem has 
been skills shortages in the labour pool. This type of programme assumes that sufficient numbers of 
jobs are available for the unemployed if they are adequately retrained and supported. It is associated 
with a political concern to encourage the unemployed to take up available work opportunities rather 
than to provide them with unemployment benefits. Typified by the US set of ‘workfare’ programmes 
and the UK ‘Welfare to Work’ initiative of the 1990s, this approach makes the provision of social 
protection benefits for the working-age unemployed conditional on participants taking up low-paid 
work or participating in work experience or training programmes. This approach will confer social 
protection benefits and promote aggregate employment only if the underlying assumption – that 
sufficient employment is available to absorb a significant number of the unemployed if they acquire 
additional skills and experience – holds true. Otherwise, such initiatives are likely to result in worker 
substitution within the existing labour force rather than in significant increases in aggregate 
employment. 
Programmes to enhance employability by addressing supply-side problems are constituents of 
broader Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP), see Martin & Grubb (2001), designed to enhance 
skills and offer incentives for re-entry into employment. The success of such programmes is 
contingent on their ability (a) to successfully transfer skills to participants, and (b) to identify skills on 
the supply side which match skills in demand in the economy. This approach also depends on the 
labour market context being characterised by frictional rather than structural unemployment, and 
therefore the existence of significant numbers of appropriate but unfilled job opportunities. The 
feasibility of such approaches has been questioned generally in the literature (ibid), as also its 
doubtful appropriateness in developing countries that face structural rather than frictional 
unemployment (Karuri et al. 2007).  
A Schema of PWP Objectives  
Establishing a PWP typology brings conceptual clarification to the PWP discussion arena. Yet there 
is a need to go beyond the PWP form to look at programme objectives in more detail, a subject 
which also is neglected in the literature and a source of conceptual confusion. A review of 
international evidence suggests that a wide range of objectives is associated with PWPs, so that a 
single programme may include a diversity of objectives. While particular goals are associated with 
certain forms of PWP - for example, type D PWPs have skills development as a key objective -   16
different PWP types are not necessarily or exclusively linked with particular objectives, resulting in 
most programmes having a range of  objectives open to being prioritised in more than one way.  
The ranking of objectives in PWPs can result in significant differences in programme design and 
social protection outcomes. Lack of clarity on the relative importance of objectives within a PWP 
with multiple, potentially competing or contradictory objectives has been identified as the cause of 
PWP failure in a number of cases (Adato et al. (1999) with reference to the South African CBPWP, 
McCord (2007b) regarding the South African EPWP; and Curtain (1999) concerning the PK in 
Indonesia).  
Drawing on the international reviews of PWP objectives set out in McCord (2005a, 2007), it is 
proposed that the objectives typically found in PWPs can be grouped into six broad categories to 
provide a conceptual schema for future PWP analysis. These categories determined by goals and 
representing sets of inter-related sub-objectives (referred to in the following text as ‘objective sets’), 
reflect PWP objectives as set out in programme documentation. As such they represent the range of 
different aspirations and intentions associated with PWP implementation, and also illustrate the 
confusion between ultimate and instrumental objectives that can reign in the current discourse.  As a 
result the objective sets are not wholly discrete, with some being instrumental or proximate 
objectives necessary to achieving other ultimate objectives. For example, skills development is 
identified as an instrument to reduce frictional unemployment. In addition, certain objectives focus 
on micro level impacts while others concern the aggregate or macro-economic consequences.  
Notwithstanding the issue of inter-relatedness, explicit identification of the range of PWP objectives  
is useful both in attempting to disaggregate the PWP concept and in providing a basis on which to 
assess PWP performance. The six objective sets are: (i) social protection, most frequently articulated 
as ‘poverty alleviation’, (ii) employment creation, (iii) skills development, (iv) asset or service 
provision, (v) macroeconomic stimulation, and (vi) political stabilisation. Within each of these 
objective sets, target outcomes are identified in greater detail. The most commonly articulated PWP 
objective is poverty alleviation. The remaining five sets are instrumental in their linkage to social 
protection outcomes, by contributing indirectly to this objective either intentionally or through the 
positive externalities anticipated from the programme. A range of other policy concerns are 
addressed directly in PWPs, being enhanced labour demand, supply-side improvements through 
skills development, gained efficiency in service provision, macroeconomic stimulation, and political 
stabilisation. This analysis clarifies the fact that PWPs can have both direct and indirect social 
protection objectives simultaneously, unlike other social protection instruments such as cash grants   17
which focus exclusively on achieving direct social protection benefits through a cash transfer. The 
six broad categories of objectives are summarised in Table 2.1 and each is assessed critically below. 
The Social Protection Objective  
The objective of social protection, often expressed as poverty alleviation, is explicitly articulated in 
most PWPs. Typically, social protection is the primary objective of a programme, reflecting its core 
rationale, as in the case of type A and B programmes. However, not all programmes explicitly 
include social protection as an objective, and for some the stated goals are intermediate or proximate 
in nature such as ‘job creation’, with the ultimate social protection outcome of higher employment 
remaining implicit. In other cases PWPs are primarily oriented towards service provision, and in 
these the social protection objective is subordinated to asset construction or service delivery. So 
protection is perceived as a secondary benefit resulting from a core service delivery function, as in 




Table 2.1: International Overview of PWP Objectives  
PWP Objective  Detail/Sub-Objectives  
Social Protection   Income relief through temporary employment  
Income relief through ongoing/repeated employment 
Improved livelihoods after exiting PWP employment 
Employment  Alleviate unemployment by creating short-term work opportunities  
Reduce frictional unemployment by increasing the capacity of those exiting PWP to take up existing unfilled work 
opportunities  
Increase aggregate demand for labour through labour intensification 
SMME development in the construction sector (change structure of demand for labour in the construction sector in order to 
facilitate greater labour intensification) (instrumental) 
Increased government expenditure – Government Employment Schemes (GES) 
Skills Development  Skills training and work experience increase capacity of participants to earn an income after exiting (instrumental, directly 
contributes to 1.3 above) 
Physical and Social 
Infrastructure Provision  
Improve provision of basic physical infrastructure and physical services (road construction and maintenance, school 
construction, dam creation, irrigation, etc.) 
Improve social infrastructure through service delivery (e.g. Home Based Care (HBC), pre-school facilities) 
Macroeconomic Stimulation   Introduce sufficient capital into economy to have stimulate demand on a regional or national level 
Political Stabilisation  Provision of visible government response to unemployment or poverty crisis.   
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The relationship between the various objective sets and social protection is often not well 
articulated in the policy literature or in programme design, with causal linkages between 
achievement of the proximate objectives and some measure of social protection often 
assumed to be axiomatic rather than demonstrated by empirical evidence. Also, the 
frequently observed mismatch between programme type and programme objectives (see for 
example McCord 2007 with reference to South Africa and Malawi) implies an assumption 
that all four types of PWP identified can successfully deliver on any of the objective sets, 
irrespective of the design features that limit the potential of each type of PWP intervention. 
For example, as remarked above, it is frequently assumed that type A (short-term) 
programmes can be successfully linked to the realisation of social protection objective sets in 
situations of chronic poverty. This is so despite the design of such a programme being 
inherently inappropriate for delivering sustained social protection outcomes in any context 
other than short-term labour market disruption.  
This linkage between programme type and stated objective is particularly problematic in 
relation to social protection, where the assumption is that any form of employment 
provision will lead to meaningful, in contrast to extremely transient, social protection gains. 
Such presumptions tend to dominate policy discussion where supporting theoretical and 
empirical analysis is particularly scarce. The work of Ravallion, Datt and Subbarao 
approaches this question, but they focus almost exclusively on long-term type B programmes 
or type A programmes in emergency situations, rather than address the problem of social 
protection impacts of type A programmes in contexts of chronic poverty. Recent work 
drawing on material from Bangladesh, Malawi, South Africa and Ethiopia (Helen Keller 
International 2007; McCord 2003; Chirwa et al. 2004, and Mengesha & Osei-Bonsu 2007) 
shows cause for concern because of the inappropriate social protection objectives ascribed 
to type A and type C PWPs in particular. The key problem here is the association of 
particular social protection objectives with the incorrect type of PWP, resulting in a poor fit 
between PWP form and function.  
When PWP objectives include some form of sustained social protection, then adequate wage 
rates and/or a prolonged duration of new employment are required to promote 
accumulation. This is so since the poor use income to satisfy basic consumption needs first, 
then invest in human capital (education and health) as well as social capital, and invest in  
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activities to promote livelihoods only thereafter. Hence, a PWP is likely to impact on 
productive investment and an improvement in livelihoods which will be sustained after the 
period of programme implementation if it provides more than the income required to ensure 
that basic consumption needs are satisfied (Devereux, 2000). Even when wage income is 
markedly limited relative to household needs however, PWPs can still have a significant 
impact by providing a form of income insurance, although a programme can serve this 
function only if the public works employment is available on a sustained basis, thereby 
ensuring ongoing income flows through employment as required. Evidence from India 
indicates that this insurance function may be of greater significance than the value of the 
transfer in terms of sustained poverty reduction, since it reduces income fluctuation and 
thereby prevents acute distress to the poor (Dev 1995).  
Three different sub-objectives relating to social protection provision can be identified in the 
literature and are set out below.  
(i) Income relief through temporary employment 
From a theoretical perspective, income relief through temporary employment is appropriate 
where the problem of poverty and/or unemployment is determined by some external shock, 
such as civil conflict, drought, floods, economic crisis or recession. It is essentially a short-
term disruption to the labour market, countered as in the Indonesian PK programme for 
instance, which was deliberately implemented in response to the 1997/8 Asian financial 
crisis. Similar circumstances motivate many PWPs in other countries where an explicit 
poverty alleviation goal is linked to a short-term episode of employment provided in 
response to a temporary labour market crisis.  
Provision of a single episode of short-term employment in the context of structural 
unemployment, when the labour market itself is not expected to provide additional large-
scale employment in the short to medium term, is problematic but does occur frequently. 
Examples are found in South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania (see discussion in McCord 
(2007b) and PWPs launched in these circumstances are scarcely questioned in the 
international literature. A notable exception is Devereux & Solomon (2006) who mention 
this issue arising out of evidence from Zambia of the limited impact of short-term PWP 
employment on poverty alleviation. The lack of discussion of the limitations of such  
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programmes in these contexts is noteworthy, as also is the fact that implementation of such 
programmes occurs relatively frequently in low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
despite being an inappropriate instrument to counter structural unemployment when the 
need is for interventions that offer sustained benefits.  
(ii) Income relief through ongoing or repeated employment 
If a PWP approach to social protection is selected to counter structural or chronic 
unemployment, or is mounted in regularly repeated episodes of unemployment or labour 
market disruption of such a kind as experienced in many developing countries, then the 
appropriate form of intervention is the provision of some form of long-term employment 
through government employment programmes (GEPs) or EGSs, rather than the brief 
duration employment provided under PWPs. The inappropriateness of once-off short-term 
episodes of employment in this context is widely recognised in the literature. See for 
example, the World Bank’s 2001 World Development Report (World Bank 2001), where it is 
explicitly argued that offering short-term PWP employment in the context of chronic 
unemployment is not likely to provide a sustained reduction in poverty. Rather than 
proposing some form of sustained PWP, such as GEP or EGS, the Bank argues that 
alternative forms of intervention offering long-term assistance, such as cash grants, may be 
more appropriate.  
(iii) Improved livelihood as a result of accumulation during PWP participation  
Many PWPs are premised on producing a sustained reduction of poverty by increasing the 
capacity of participants to earn an income after exiting the programme. This could be 
achieved by promoting (a) financial accumulation through wage payments; or (b) the 
accumulation of productive assets through savings or acquired access (this could be through 
the provision of productive assets as an output of the PWP itself); and (c) from the 
accumulation of human capital (via skills development and experience) during programme 
participation,. If these forms of accumulation prove adequate to improve livelihoods, then 
these sub-objectives would be met.  
While financial and physical asset accumulations are not conceptually problematic, the 
positive livelihoods value of improvements assumed for supply-side characteristics is not 
conceptually robust in all labour market contexts. This is so given that any intervention to  
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increase the ‘employability’ of participants is conditional on the availability of sufficient jobs 
(see for example Meth (2008)). This limitation is discussed below in relation to the skills 
development objective. 
The Employment Objective 
PWPs seek to address employment in four ways, three directly and one indirectly. These are 
(i) the provision of temporary jobs, (ii) reducing frictional unemployment through improving 
the quality of labour supply, in terms of higher levels of human capital, (iii) increasing 
aggregate demand by shifting the relative factor intensity of infrastructure provision towards 
labour intensification and the promotion of SMMEs, and (iv) increasing public sector 
employment. Each is briefly examined below. 
(i) Provision of Temporary Jobs 
As discussed above, the provision of temporary employment tends to characterise PWPs 
implemented during a period of temporary labour market disruption expected to normalise 
in the short to medium term. An example is the provision of a short episode of employment 
through the Indonesian PK programme which was a response to a particular and acute 
(short-term) labour market shock which created a short-term spike in unemployment 
(Vaidya & Abedin 2007). 
(ii) Reducing Frictional Unemployment through Labour Supply Improvements  
The temporary nature of the employment offered under many type A, C and D PWPs in 
situations of chronic rather than acute rises in unemployment may be justified in terms of 
the programme objectives of providing ‘spill-over benefits’ (work experience and training), 
rather than aiming to make a significant contribution to aggregate employment or poverty 
relief per se.
18 Viewed in this way, in addition to the temporary cash wage which provides 
immediate assistance to participants, another purpose of the temporary jobs is explicitly to 
offer training and work experience to the unemployed in order to improve their labour 
market performance once they have exited the programme. This links to the skills 
development objective outlined below. 
                                                            
18 An example of a programme with such a stated objective is the South African EPWP.  
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In programmes intended to reduce frictional unemployment the objective is to improve the 
quality of labour supply, so that workers will be able to take up unfilled jobs already existing in 
the economy. This aim characterises PWP interventions which form one component of active 
labour market policies in OECD countries. Overall the objective of such policies is the 
reduction of unemployment which is primarily ‘frictional’ in kind, i.e. unemployment that 
results from a mismatch between the skills available in the labour force and those required 
by the economy, which in principle can be addressed by the provision of relevant skills and 
experience to improve the quality of labour supply (Martin & Grubb 2001).  
However, this approach is based on the premise that there are sufficient existing work 
opportunities to absorb the unemployed if they are given training and work experience 
through PWP employment, or other forms of appropriate labour market assistance like 
remedial education. But this is not the case in many sub-Saharan African countries, where 
the number of unfilled job vacancies existing in the economy resulting from skills shortages 
is often marginal in relation to the scale of unemployment (see for example Kraak (2003)). 
The positive potential of a supply-side improvement intervention in PWPs offering short 
term employment is further constrained by the necessarily short duration of training, which 
limits adequate levels of skills transfers as does the sometimes poor quality of training 
provided (see Karuri et al. (2007)). Where workers do subsequently achieve employment as a 
result of the limited training received, this can result in the displacement of other low-skilled 
workers rather than leading to net increases in aggregate employment.  
The effectiveness of this PWP approach even within OECD countries has been seriously 
challenged in recent years, so that its appropriateness outside the OECD in contexts where a 
great deal of unemployment is not frictional but structural is certainly questionable.  
(iii) Increasing Aggregate Demand through Labour Intensification  
Increasing aggregate demand for labour through labour intensification – raising labour input 
per unit of output - and therefore higher aggregate consumption or through increased 
government expenditure is a central presumption of many PWPs. These are founded on 
attempts to close an economy’s job gap through direct state intervention when market-based 
employment demand is inadequate, in all cases by providing more adequate livelihoods for a 
large segment of the population.  
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Attempts to increase labour demand through the labour intensification (LI) of production 
are widespread in practice. They are conducted primarily via the provision of physical 
infrastructure, as exemplified by the ILO Employment Intensive Investment Programme 
(EIIP) model and AGETIP in Senegal. Such programmes do not necessarily require 
additional budgetary allocations, since then entail only a shift in the factor intensity of 
existing expenditure to increase employment. 
Despite the implementation of labour intensification programmes internationally, these have 
not yet become mainstream policies internationally, and they remain marginal components 
of infrastructure provision. In South Africa for example, although LI forms a major 
rhetorical component of the state’s strategy to ‘accelerate and share’ growth (South Africa, 
The Presidency 2006), only a limited proportion of infrastructure projects suitable for labour 
intensification adopt LI approaches, and this is explicitly recognised as an area where the 
national PWP has failed to meet its objectives (South Africa,  DoPW 2007). In South Africa, 
as elsewhere, this is largely due to lack of buy-in to LI approaches within the mainstream 
construction industry (Mabilo 2003; McDermott 2006). In general, the potential for 
expansion of aggregate employment in construction remains largely unrealised 
internationally.  
In PWPs with this objective, the focus is on the macroeconomic impact, in terms of an 
aggregate expansion of the labour market, rather than the social protection impact on 
individuals. The latter outcome of such interventions is highly contingent on programme 
design features which determine the nature of the work provided (duration, wage level, etc.), 
and also on the socio-economic characteristics of those able to access the additional 
employment generated.  
(iv) SMME Development in the Construction Sector 
The objective of labour intensification is often associated with a broader attempt to change 
the structure of demand for labour in the construction sector, as in the case of the 
Community Based Public Works Programme (CBPWP) in South Africa and the AGETIP in 
Senegal (Wade 2004). However, in order for such a transformation to be achieved, the 
development of a cadre of contractors familiar with LI approaches is required, along with 
the development of SMMEs with the capacity to implement a Labour-Based Infrastructure  
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Programme (LBIP) in the construction sector. Sometimes this features as an instrumental 
objective within PWPs.  
What is entailed is investment in the promotion of construction and maintenance-oriented 
SMMEs expected to utilise more labour-intensive techniques of production than larger 
enterprises (CIDB 2008). SMME creation was a major component of the AGETIP 
programme in Senegal, which recognised that the creation of a cadre of SMMEs was both an 
end in itself as well as a necessary prerequisite if a large-scale shift to LI was to take place 
(McCord 2007b). Interestingly however, there is no evidence for the robustness of this 
assumption, and the impact of promoting SMME engagement in PWP may be one of 
worker substitution within the labour force (which may or may not itself be a deliberate 
policy objective) rather than the creation of new jobs. This is so particularly in situations 
where labour intensity is already high and existing personnel are made redundant in favour 
of PWP workers employed by SMMEs (McCord 2004, 2006 show this in the Gundo Lashu 
Programme in Limpopo Province and the Western Cape EPWP). 
(v) Government Employment Programmes 
Increasing aggregate employment through increased government expenditure is one of the 
most conventional forms of employment creation. It has been adopted in a wide range of 
contexts, the most well known historical example being the New Deal programmes in the 
USA in the 1930s.. These were mirrored by the employment programmes for ‘poor whites’ 
in South Africa during the same period (Abedian & Standish 1986). More recent examples 
include the massive MEGS and NREGP in India, and the Argentinian Jefes programme 
(Harvey 2007b). In these initiatives, employment may be directly provided by the 
government or through the private or NGO sectors based on an expansion of government 
funding to increase employment in labour-intensive activities. 
PWPs with this objective are dependent on significant additional public expenditure, which 
may be funded either through deficit funding, as in the New Deal, or additional off-budget 
donor funds to pay for the creation of additional jobs, as in the case of the PSNP. Without a 
significant fiscal allocation, the aggregate increase in employment from a GEP is likely to be 
marginal, as illustrated by the EPWP in South Africa implemented without an additional 
budgetary allocations. Its impact on aggregate employment is extremely limited, providing  
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only 80,000 person years of work per annum (South Africa Department of Public Works 
2007) when unemployment levels are four to eight million.  
The adoption of a government employment programme (GEP) to meet the objective of 
increasing aggregate employment is ideologically in tension with the public sector 
restructuring and downsizing carried out by many MIC and LIC in recent decades. This 
renders the implementation of such an approach problematic in many contexts, particularly 
where governments are concerned to avoid being identified as populist in their policy 
stances.  
Skills Development Objective 
The objective of providing skills training and additional work experience to increase the 
capacity of participants to earn an income after exiting from a PWP is instrumental in terms 
of the reduction of frictional unemployment. This policy seeks to provide skills training and 
work experience through PWP employment, in order to increase the capacity of the 
unemployed to earn an income after participating in the programme.  This human capital 
approach is central to many OECD PWPs, and has been highly influential not only in the 
active labour market policy discussions in recent decades in developed countries, but also to 
a lesser degree in middle and low income countries. This strategy has been found to have 
only a limited impact, and to improve the subsequent labour market performance of 
participants only if the training provided is closely aligned to the specific skills gaps if 
identified accurately in the wider economy (Martin & Grubb 2001). Based on their review of 
international experience, Martin and Grubb argue that where training is included in 
programmes it should be kept small in scale, and ‘well targeted to the specific needs of both 
job seekers and local employers’ (ibid:33).  The South African EPWP is one instance of a 
programme which does not conform with these guidelines, because the training offered is 
not closely aligned with the skills shortages identified in South Africa which are primarily for 
semi-skilled, artisanal and skilled workers. This shortcoming is a consequence of the limited 
training contact time possible during the brief period of EPWP employment.
19 This 
                                                            
19 This is explicitly acknowledged in the Infrastructure Sector Plan for the EPWP, 2005, which states ‘the 
nature of the labour-intensive construction industry is such that [...] employment opportunities for labourers 
typically last only four to six months. [...], this entitles labourers to only eight to 12 days of paid training. 
This is not sufficient for training unskilled labourers to become artisans’ (EPWP, 2005).  
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limitation remains significant since it has been recognised officially in the South African 
policy arena that PWP employment without skills development will not have a sustained 
beneficial impact. One example is the EPWP documentation citing the proceedings of the 
2004 Growth and Development Summit: 
‘…job creation without skills development, upgrading and training, does not lend 
itself to sustainable employment and will have no long-term economic impact on the 
lives of the unemployed…’ (EPWP 2004) 
This insight from the EPWP provides a general critique of the limited potential for training 
offered by short term PWPs. By contrast, within the Ethiopian PSNP and the MASAF 
Improving Livelihoods through Public Works (ILTPWP) programmes, this problem is 
addressed through putting in place complementary training programmes such as agricultural 
livelihood-promotion activities and small business training. These are external to the PWP 
itself and so are not constrained by the operational rigidities of the PWP in its duration, 
management, or content (McCord 2007).  
These programmes aim to promote livelihoods through self-employment, although often at 
a survivalist level, rather than formal employment in order to facilitate ‘graduation’ from 
PWP dependence after a limited period of PWP support. The idea of ‘graduation’ upon exit 
from type A PWPs is prevalent in the programme design documentation, and is central to 
the conceptualisation of the EPWP in South Africa, the Malawi MASAF PWPs, and the 
Ethiopian PSNP. However, there is no empirical evidence of success in the literature to 
support this aspiration, and the limited evidence available suggests that most PWP 
participants return to the employment and poverty status quo ante o n c e  t h e y  e x i t  P W P  
employment (Sultan & Slater 2005; Ndoto & Macun 2005). 
It is interesting to note from the international literature that skills development is not 
typically a component of the programmes offering employment guarantees in the context of 
chronic unemployment. The NREGP does not include a skills development component but 
focuses on the ongoing provision of PWP employment in order to guarantee an income. 
Community development, skills training and livelihood-related interventions are carried out 
in association with the PWP, in the form of parallel programmes instituted at the same time, 
but not in the expectation that participation in these activities will reduce future vulnerability 
to the extent that the need for ongoing PWP support will be obviated.   
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In contrast, the Jefes and New Deal programmes both contain training and retraining 
components, but there were critical implementation differences. For instance, contact time 
with participants was not limited to an average of four to six months (entailing a total of 
eight to 12 days’ training contact time under the EPWP). Further, training was linked to 
skills demanded in the wide range of different jobs included within the PWP programmes, 
which were far more diverse in kind than in the EPWP-based employment. The capacity of 
both Jefes and New Deal to train and absorb reskilled workers was significantly higher than 
is the case within the EPWP, given the significant capacity constraints facing EPWP 
programme designers and managers, which inhibit the potential for the EPWP to employ a 
wider range of EPWP-trained workers. Also, it is interesting to note that the training within 
Jefes was intended to promote the ability of participants to engage in the open labour market 
once the economic recession lifted (Harvey 2007b). This prospect of imminent economic 
recovery from recession is not relevant in many contexts where the labour market problem is 
structural rather than cyclical, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Physical and Social Infrastructure Provision Objective 
There are two main forms of infrastructure which may be provided through PWP: physical 
infrastructure, the conventional approach, and social infrastructure. Each is discussed in turn 
below. 
(i) Improved Provision of Basic Physical Infrastructure  
In much of the literature the service provision function of PWPs is their unique selling 
point, rendering them preferable to alternative forms of social protection. This is clearly 
articulated in relation to physical asset provision by the ILO: 
Employment-intensive investment approaches present an opportunity through 
which the two challenges [employment and infrastructure] can be addressed 
simultaneously (Amri-Makhetha 2007). 
In accordance with this vision, infrastructure provision (primarily road construction) is the 
primary objective in PWPs supported by the ILO’s Employment Intensive Investment 
Programme (EIIP) (ILO 2004), and pursuing their stated objectives in labour-intensive ways 
is recommended in order to increase aggregate employment. Similarly, in Rwanda PWPs 
have been identified as means to promote the provision of productive assets (Mellor 2003), a  
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policy orientation present also in countries recovering from conflict and requiring 
infrastructure reconstruction, such as Serbia, Iraq and Afghanistan (see, for example, Bonin 
& Rinne (2006)).  
However, on the spectrum of national examples PWPs differ significantly in the relative 
emphasis given to the objective of infrastructure provision, even in instances when asset 
creation is nominally a key objective. In such programmes the construction of physical assets 
is merely a way to satisfy the ‘work’ conditionality required for receipt of a transfer rather 
than the core rationale for the programme, against which it is evaluated. In some cases, such 
as the PSNP in Ethiopia, the PK in Indonesia, and the Jefes programme in Argentina, the 
primary motivation for the PWP is the delivery of the wage to participants in order to 
alleviate poverty. Asset construction activity exists primarily to satisfy the work requirement 
which is essentially a targeting mechanism, on the basis of the principle of less eligibility (as 
discussed above).  
In the Indian, Ethiopian and Argentinian programmes, when it has not been possible to 
provide sufficient work projects to absorb all those seeking work within an accepted time, 
the work condition has been waived, and the cash transfer provided without any work being 
performed
20. In these cases it is evident that the asset creation objective is wholly subsidiary 
to the social protection imperative. Thus it is not a requisite component of the programme, 
with the result that it can be dropped if necessary for the successful pursuit of the primary 
social protection objective.  This situation differs significantly from that which would obtain 
in a type D programme, where asset creation is the primary purpose of PWP 
implementation. 
(ii) Improve Social Infrastructure through Service Delivery  
While the dominant form of employment in PWPs is the construction of physical 
infrastructure like roads and dams, historically a wide range of activities have been included 
under the PWP banner, including social service provision. In the New Deal programmes, 
PWP employment extended to teaching, adult literacy, nursery care, social care, the 
implementation of national statistical surveys and culture and performance art, as well as the 
                                                            
20 In such instances where the programme is delinked from service delivery, the programme becomes 
difficult to distinguish in conception and practice from a cash transfer programme.   
  30
production of consumer goods for direct distribution to recipients of public assistance 
(Harvey, 2007). In Ireland, the Community Employment Programme (CEP) provided 
complementary social services, while the Jefes programme included funding for 
microeconomic activities in agriculture and home production, as well as social care for 
children and the elderly. The lower material input cost of social rather than physical service 
delivery has the potential to significantly reduce PWP implementation costs, and also 
increase the range of activities absorbing labour to enable an expansion of the scale of 
potential programme employment. In recent years programmes have been developed in sub-
Saharan Africa which simultaneously provide employment for the poor, while also 
expanding social service provision in addressing the burden of unpaid care which falls largely 
on women and is increasing due to the impacts of HIV/AIDS. The key challenges relating 
particularly to the social service delivery component of PWPs are: (i) the issue of quality 
control, (ii) the sustainability of service provision offered through non-permanent 
programmes, and (iii) confusion regarding statutory responsibility for service delivery by 
different branches of government.  
The use of PWPs to create social as well as physical assets is one of the most innovative 
aspects of PWP programming to have developed in recent years. This policy emphasis has 
developed largely in response to the needs of households affected by HIV/AIDS. It 
emerged spontaneously in southern Africa in recognition of the need to support social 
infrastructure in the context of high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates and the growing pressure 
placed on households and existing service providers. PWP provision of social services is 
concentrated on Early Childhood Care and Development (ECCD) and Home Based Care 
(HBC), also called Home Community Based Care (HCBC) in South Africa.  
 
Within the region it is primarily Community Based Organisations (CBOs), Faith-Based 
Organisations (FBOs) and national branches of the Red Cross that have developed social 
service-based employment programmes. As said already, this was a response to the growth 
of the HIV pandemic starting from the objective of increased service provision rather than 
employment creation (McCord 2005a). In South Africa, this innovation has been 
incorporated into the EPWP with the dual objective of offering employment while also 
improving service delivery. It is particularly attractive as a PWP employment option, since it  
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offers an opportunity to provide sustained part-time employment while meeting a recognised 
social need. Further, such programmes have the potential to absorb large numbers of 
workers through increased funding to the NGO or CBO sectors, and with the likely roll-out 
of VCT and ARVs throughout the region the respective needs for para-medical and social 
support are likely to increase further. 
 
The Zimbabwe Red Cross Home Based Care (HBC) programme, operational since 1992, 
illustrates the potential for the objectives of PWP employment and service provision to be 
addressed jointly. The HBC programme is one component of an integrated range of 
initiatives offered by the Red Cross for those affected by HIV/AIDS. It includes food 
distribution and agricultural development, employs over 2000 HBC facilitators, and supports 
an estimated 40,000 people directly and indirectly (ibid.). In South Africa, when the need for 
an extension of social service provision is recognised it has led to the inclusion of social 
service provision in the national Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP), with the  
stated objective of extending the outreach of social service provision. Social sector 
employment in Early Childhood Care and Development (ECCD) and Home Community 
Based Care (HCBC) comprises 13% of total planned PWP employment (McCord 2005b), 
and the subsequent employment of EPWP ‘graduates’ of HCBC and ECCD is contingent 
on ongoing and expanding state funding of NGO activity in the social sector. 
While social service provision through PWP has focused on HBC and ECD, opportunities 
have been identified to expand PWP employment into a wide range of social sector 
interventions in sub-Saharan Africa. Currently unmet demand for services is inhibiting access 
to services such as support of ARV roll-out, Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT) 
service provision, tuberculosis (TB) sputum sample collection
21 and delivery, birth 
registration, and a range of social grant registration and application services. This shift into 
social rather than physical infrastructure represents a significant opportunity for the 
expansion of socially constructive employment in PWP programmes in countries where 
service provision for the poor is otherwise constrained. This is particularly so at a time when 
demand for services is increasing as a consequence of rising HIV/AIDS infections. If 
                                                            
21 Ginsburg, adviser to the KwaZulu Natal Department of Transport and Public Works, provided 
information on implementing the Zibambele PWP, 2005, pers. comm.  
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adequately funded, PWP employment in this sector also has the potential to offer the 
extended periods of employment required in a GEP or EGS, in contrast to the short-term 
nature of employment inherent in physical infrastructure provision.  
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Macroeconomic Stimulation Objective 
Historically, PWPs have sometimes been adopted in pursuit of macroeconomic objectives,  
predicated on the injection of sufficient additional expenditure into the economy through 
payment of the PWP wage to stimulate demand on a regional or national level. Thereby it 
stimulates secondary employment effects and raises economic growth.  To achieve this, the 
scale of the employment created must be large and the resulting infrastructure economically 
productive. 
This objective, with its Keynesian undertones, is rarely stated explicitly in current PWP 
discussion, although it has been a major factor behind the adoption of PWP in the past, and 
has very recently returned to prominence as a response to the mass rise in US 
unemployment resulting from the 2008 economic crisis
22. As mentioned earlier, the most 
notable examples were the New Deal programmes implemented in the USA during the 
depression of the 1930s. At that time such policies entailed massive budgetary expenditure 
on direct government employment, and the decision to adopt such a massive and fiscally 
risky programme was contentious even at that time (Harvey 2007a). PWPs implemented 
under the US New Deal programme entailed a massive expansion of state expenditure by the 
federal government, consuming an average 4% of GDP annually in an attempt to stimulate 
the macro-economy while also providing sufficient employment to absorb a significant 
proportion of the unemployed and ensure that the basic needs of their families were met. 
Such employment was provided in special programmes operated both directly by the 
government and also through private contractors, together funded by massive expansion in 
infrastructure expenditure. At their height these programmes absorbed over 50% of the 
unemployed, made a significant impact by promoting counter-cyclical expenditure and 
therefore aggregate demand. Economic growth was stimulated directly while the deficit 
spending also created assets which themselves performed the function of enabling higher 
growth during the period of ongoing recession (ibid).  
                                                            
22 The US President elect has been reported as stating that ‘we will create millions of jobs by making the 
single largest new investment in our national infrastructure since the creation of the federal highway system 
in the 1950s’, Obama Pledges Public Works on a Vast Scale. New York Times, 6 December 2008.   
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The New Deal programmes illustrate that attempting to achieve macroeconomic stimulation 
through large-scale government employment creation is contingent on massive state 
resource allocations over time, as well as on the availability of human capital (administrative, 
managerial and technical) to manage implementation (ibid). It is relevant to note that the 
capacity to manage such a massive and complex programme effectively was in part due to 
the nature of the economic crisis resulting in unemployment across the skills spectrum. This 
rendered managerial, technical and administrative capacity readily available for deployment 
within the programme. Such a situation is rare in contemporary settings, especially in 
developing countries including South Africa, where a shortage of the skills required for 
effective programme implementation represents a major constraint to effective programme 
execution.  
Political Stabilisation Objective  
A review of the implementation timeframes of PWPs launched in different countries in 
recent decades suggests that the final PWP objective may be an essentially political one; that 
is, a visible government response to an unemployment or poverty crisis with the aim of 
promoting political stabilisation and electoral support. Political change or instability is a 
common contextual feature at the initiation of many PWPs. During such unstable periods it 
is politically important for the state to be seen to be addressing unemployment in order to 
secure electoral support, and PWPs offer the potential for high visibility intervention. The 
AGETIP, NREGP, EPWP and PK all fall into this category, being implemented 
immediately prior to key political moments such as elections or periods of threat to the 
existing regime (McCord 2007). Although PWPs may be implemented to promote political 
stabilisation, this objective is more frequently implicit than explicit. Somewhat unusually 
though, this consideration was mentioned explicitly in a review of the AGETIP by its 
designer, who candidly stated that one of the success indicators applicable to the programme 
was its high ‘cost/visibility ratio’ (Wade 2004). Similarly, one particularly high-profile PWP in 
South Africa offering the best penetration into the rural poor, the largest scale of operation 
and the greatest impact was implemented in one of only two provinces where the ruling  
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party did not have a secure electoral majority
23. In such contexts PWP visibility may be more 
important than the actual content or coverage of the programme. This is true for AGETIP 
which attained only minimal coverage (less than 0.5% of the labour force), and yet is widely 
considered to be a PWP success story emulated throughout the West Africa region 
(McCord,2007b). This may also be true of the national EPWP in South Africa, which is 
presented in the popular discourse as a significant intervention to address the problem of the 
working age poor, despite its extremely limited coverage and impact; the presentation of a 
programme as credible and successful may be of greater political importance than its actual 
performance, at least in the short term.  
Discussion of Objectives  
As illustrated above, the PWP concept incorporates a range of potential objectives. These 
may be implicit or explicit and vary in their priority ranking. Programmes sometimes adopt a 
multiplicity of objectives. Such diversity may not necessarily be consistent with the type of 
PWP selected and may even be mutually contradictory in the programme design 
requirements. An example is the tension between the provision of quality assets and the 
urgency of providing immediate wage transfers, as in the PSNP, and thereby create trade-
offs or conflicts within a programme.  
It is suggested in the literature that the existence of multiple objectives in any programme 
reduces the likelihood of programme success. In part this is due to the increased managerial, 
administrative and coordination burden these objectives imply and in part due to the 
potentially conflicting priorities implied by diverse objectives (Curtain 1999). A similar 
problem was identified in the case of the South African EPWP, where it was argued that the 
coexistence of multiple objectives resulted in confusion reigning among implementers and 
beneficiaries regarding the nature of the programme, with negative consequences for both 
performance and accountability (Karuri et al. 2007).  
The New Deal programmes were able to accommodate a diversity of mandates due to the 
adoption of a flexible institutional structure in which individual programmes were 
                                                            
23 The Zibambele programme, uniquely successful among PWPs in South Africa, is examined in detail in 
chapters eight to ten of McCord (2008). It was implemented by the ruling ANC (African National 
Congress) in KwaZulu-Natal province, one of only two provinces where the ANC had a real political 
competitor in the  IFP (Inkatha Freedom Party) and where the provincial elections are highly contested.  
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implemented by different agencies with clear and discrete mandates and having the authority 
to elicit cooperation from a variety of other government agencies (Harvey 2007a). Such 
management flexibility is rare in current PWPs. Where there is an attempt to address 
multiple objectives within one programme, as in the case of the South African EPWP
24, 
there is a risk that the state department leading the programme may lack the authority and 
the skills to coordinate across diverse ministries. This issue is particularly problematic if the 
lead department is one primarily charged with physical infrastructure provision, or is an 
external body, such as a Project Management Unit (PMU), with limited links to local or 
national government departments.  
Conclusion  
A critical weakness in the social protection policy discourse at the present time is the failure 
to recognise that PWPs are a highly heterogeneous form of intervention. In the absence of 
an analytical framework providing a PWP typology or schema of programme objectives 
openly recognising their heterogeneity, PWPs are poorly conceptualised. The presumption 
that a single type of PWP (the PWP ‘archetype’ offering short term PWP employment) can 
be implemented effectively in a variety of settings without recognising that a particular type 
of PWP can achieve only a limited set of objectives and can function effectively only in a 
particular labour market context, is pervasive in the literature as well as in programme 
design. This problem is one consequence of the conceptualisation of a PWP as a monolithic 
rather than highly differentiated set of linked but functionally discrete interventions. What 
results is the tendency to adopt the generic term PWP without further definition or 
discussion, and to assume that whatever form of PWP is selected a range of policy problems 
can be addressed, irrespective of the type of programme in question or the nature of the 
underlying labour market problem.  In this way, the relationship between PWP form and 
function remains fuzzy in both academic and political discussion. 
This conceptual weakness has additional programme design and analytical consequences. 
Failure to set programme objectives with adequate rigour can lead to tensions and 
contradictions between objectives and negatively effect programme outcome (Curtain 1999), 
                                                            
24 With reference to the objectives of the South African CBPWP, the predecessor of the EPWP, it was 
stated that ‘Relief and development, income generation and empowerment, jobs today and training for 
future jobs … is… without a precedent elsewhere in the world.’ (Adato et al, 1999: xiii).   
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while any assessment of programme performance is fundamentally influenced by the 
objectives against which a programme is evaluated. Neither the lack of analytical rigour in 
specifying PWP form and objectives, nor the programme design and its wider analytical 
consequences are recognised in the existing literature.   
This Working Paper has addressed this critical weakness by providing a PWP typology and a 
schema of objectives in order to provide a framework for discussion. This will enable more 
rigorous use of the term PWP in policy analysis, as well as more explicit statements on PWP 
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